Creating the Text: Examining Realism and Unrealism in Historians’ Fight to Write the Truth

Since the development of the written record, historians have been obsessed with truth. Accuracy, in regards to historical accounts, has become nearly synonymous with neutrality and the accumulation of evidence in order to validate records. The desire to eradicate dishonesty and fabrication in historical writing created a sharp division between what was considered fictional and what was considered nonfictional. From this dichotomy, historians developed a methodology that sought to define this division systematically, in a manner through which such methodology could be incorporated into the practice of historiography. Truth became realism, a murky concept whose definition changes depending on individual interpretation. Consequently, in order to provide clarification, historians have sought to standardize the act of written realism in the hopes that it will help foster an avoidance of falsity.

In an excerpt from his 1973 book, “Metahistory”, Hayden White addresses the issue of realism in the documentation of historical events, specifically the issue of realism as it existed in nineteenth-century European culture. He describes the confusion attached to the concept as a problem of the physical sciences versus the social sciences. Many realists of the time were convinced that realism had its basis in provable, empirical philosophies like the physical sciences; however, this assumption ignored realism’s underlying relation to social reality, or, the circumstances created by social interactions which transcend individual actions (White 45-47). The problem now lay in the overall construction of social reality, and what standardization of realism, in this era, it represented. Finding the solution to this problem does not give any insight to the true essence of realism, White argues, but instead shows what it means to be, conversely, unrealistic (White 45-47).

White’s theory can be applied to historiography dating as far back as the twelfth century, when the Arab Muslim historiographer and historian Ibn Khaldun wrote Al Muqaddimah. Originally intended to function as a documentation of universal history, or the history of humanity as a whole, Al Muqaddimah became known as a precedent for the philosophy of history and how historians legitimize realism in their written accounts. In his Preliminary Remarks, part of a collection of prologues to the actual content of the book, Ibn Khaldun outlines the purpose of history in regards to documentation. He claims that history functions as information about human social organization, which is the same as global civilization (Khaldun 5), and as such, explains the conditions affecting the nature of civilization. Most importantly, however, he discusses “untruth”, or unrealism, and how it is unavoidable in documenting historical information.

Implying that Arab scholars of the time put too much faith in historical sources without considering their credibility, Ibn Khaldun gives multiple examples of the ways in which principles of realism can be breached. He lists partisanship, a lack of awareness of the purpose of an event, ignorance of how conditions conform to reality, and the characterization of high-ranking figures as linked to the transmission of untruth—all condemned fiercely as resulting in falsehood due to the unreliability of the transmitters (Khaldun 5-6). Above all, though, he emphasizes “an ignorance of the nature of the various conditions arising in civilization”, defined by the rule that “every event or phenomenon…must inevitably possess a nature peculiar to its essence as well as to the accidental conditions that may attach themselves to it” (Khaldun 6). This “ignorance” of the multifaceted condition of humans and their individual interpretations of their social reality becomes the basis behind Ibn Khaldun’s argument for a change in historical analysis by Arab scholars. He makes it apparent for them to note that it is most important to understand the idea of multiple perspectives in order to comprehend why flaws are unavoidable and how absurdities are accepted. As a result, he advocates active and critical investigation instead of passive absorption, and demonstrates that a standardization of realism simply does not exist. In accordance with White’s theory, Ibn Khaldun does not provide insight into what realism actually is, but instead describes the nature of unrealism, and delves further into the theory by explaining the factors that go into the development of unrealism in historiography and how it is unconsciously weaved into the fabric of social reality. Furthermore, at the end of the Preliminary Remarks, he concedes that he is “inspired by God. If [he has] succeeded in presenting the problems of this science, this is due to divine guidance” (Khaldun 10). In other words, the truth in Al Muqaddimah is not because of his own intellect, but because of the majesty of God.

Ultimately, Hayden White and Ibn Khaldun prove that accuracy cannot be the sole factor that legitimizes the methodology of historical documentation. While it is important for historians remain as neutral, factual, and comprehensive as possible, it is equally important for their readers to remember that the unreliability of transmitters, and thus the unreliability of their information, is a given in any written record. As a result, the separation of realism and unrealism—including fiction and nonfiction—after every effort to purify the text has been attempted, is out of the historian’s hands and up to readers and scholars to investigate.

Works Cited

Khaldun, Ibn. Al Muqaddimah. N.p., n.d. Print.

White, Hayden. Metahistory. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973. Print.